By Robbie Whelan
Wall Street Journal
FEBRUARY 1, 2011
When will the tide of foreclosures start to ebb?The Obama administration hopes that foreclosures will slow with the help of its Home Affordable Modification Program, but the effort has been hobbled by, among other things, the high number of homeowners who re-default on their mortgages, even after generous interest-rate reductions and term extensions from their lenders. Loan modifications alone won’t cut it, according to ratings agency Standard & Poor’s.“The mods cannot cure the entire problem. Maybe if the economy picks up and more people get jobs, that would cure it, but nobody’s really forecasting a decline in unemployment,” says Diane Westerback, a managing director in S&P’s structured finance unit.But there are some bright spots. According to an S&P yearly report, a full version of which was released Tuesday, the country’s shadow inventory – or the volume of mortgages that are either delinquent or in foreclosure and have yet to hit the market – continues to fall, albeit at a progressively slower rate. (S&P only includes loans that were packaged and sold as securities by Wall Street and do not have a guarantee from government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in its definition of “shadow inventory.”)Interestingly, one of the reasons S&P gives for the continued decline is that fewer loans are being foreclosed on as banks step up efforts to “cure” them, or modify them so that homeowners are able to pay. The time it takes for a lender to foreclose on a borrower has lengthened – from about 20 months to about 40 – and more loans are moving from the “distressed” column to the “modified” and “current” columns.“As the crisis started hitting, the servicers starting pushing everything to foreclosure, and then they said, ‘Wait a minute, let’s not throw everyone out of their homes.’ So the level of modifications rose,” Ms. Westerback said. “The servicers want their mods to be successful. They want them to work.”But S&P’s numbers also show that of all the modifications done a year ago– both through HAMP and by the banks on their own – some 40% of them have fallen back into default. That percentage is way down from the dark days of the housing crash in late 2007 and early 2008, when 75% of modified loans were failing, but it’s still not a great track record for the practice of loan modification.In today’s WSJ, we reported on a related issue: While the government’s HAMP program has had disappointing results, loan modifications done voluntarily between a bank and a borrower, outside of HAMP, are picking up the slack and have accounted for nearly four times as many loan modifications as the government program.These loan modifications, called “proprietary,” are “potentially one way out of the shadow inventory,” Ms. Westerback said.So what does it all add up to? Longer foreclosure times and more private modifications may be good news for borrowers, but could mean banks are spending lots of money on lawyers to process foreclosures and on upkeep for foreclosed homes.Either way, the shadow inventory remains a major obstacle. The outstanding principal balance of the nation’s shadow inventory is about $450 billion, or nearly one-third of all the nation’s existing home loans that have been bundled into private, non-GSE backed securities, according to S&P. That’s a lot of bad loans. And the rate at which the shadow inventory is shrinking is getting smaller every month, as the economy continues to slog along with low job creation and tight credit.
When will the tide of foreclosures start to ebb?
The Obama administration hopes that foreclosures will slow with the help of its Home Affordable Modification Program, but the effort has been hobbled by, among other things, the high number of homeowners who re-default on their mortgages, even after generous interest-rate reductions and term extensions from their lenders. Loan modifications alone won’t cut it, according to ratings agency Standard & Poor’s.
“The mods cannot cure the entire problem. Maybe if the economy picks up and more people get jobs, that would cure it, but nobody’s really forecasting a decline in unemployment,” says Diane Westerback, a managing director in S&P’s structured finance unit.
But there are some bright spots. According to an S&P yearly report, a full version of which was released Tuesday, the country’s shadow inventory—or the volume of mortgages that are either delinquent or in foreclosure and have yet to hit the market—continues to fall, albeit at a progressively slower rate. (S&P only includes loans that were packaged and sold as securities by Wall Street and do not have a guarantee from government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in its definition of “shadow inventory.”)
Interestingly, one of the reasons S&P gives for the continued decline is that fewer loans are being foreclosed on as banks step up efforts to “cure” them, or modify them so that homeowners are able to pay. The time it takes for a lender to foreclose on a borrower has lengthened—from about 20 months to about 40—and more loans are moving from the “distressed” column to the “modified” and “current” columns.
“As the crisis started hitting, the servicers starting pushing everything to foreclosure, and then they said, ‘Wait a minute, let’s not throw everyone out of their homes.’ So the level of modifications rose,” Ms. Westerback said. “The servicers want their mods to be successful. They want them to work.”
But S&P’s numbers also show that of all the modifications done a year ago—both through HAMP and by the banks on their own—some 40% of them have fallen back into default. That percentage is way down from the dark days of the housing crash in late 2007 and early 2008, when 75% of modified loans were failing, but it’s still not a great track record for the practice of loan modification.
In today’s WSJ, we reported on a related issue: While the government’s HAMP program has had disappointing results, loan modifications done voluntarily between a bank and a borrower, outside of HAMP, are picking up the slack and have accounted for nearly four times as many loan modifications as the government program.
These loan modifications, called “proprietary,” are “potentially one way out of the shadow inventory,” Ms. Westerback said.
So what does it all add up to? Longer foreclosure times and more private modifications may be good news for borrowers, but could mean banks are spending lots of money on lawyers to process foreclosures and on upkeep for foreclosed homes.
Either way, the shadow inventory remains a major obstacle. The outstanding principal balance of the nation’s shadow inventory is about $450 billion, or nearly one-third of all the nation’s existing home loans that have been bundled into private, non-GSE backed securities, according to S&P. That’s a lot of bad loans. And the rate at which the shadow inventory is shrinking is getting smaller every month, as the economy continues to slog along with low job creation and tight credit.
By Alan Zibel
Wall Street Journal
December 20, 2010
Efforts to help troubled homeowners avoid foreclosure have been plagued with problems over the past two years. One big hurdle: Many homeowners who receive modifications to their loan terms wind up falling into default again.
A study published Monday by the Urban Institute found that working with a nonprofit housing counselor dramatically lowers the probability of those re-defaults.
The study evaluated borrowers who got help through the congressionally mandated National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program, run by nonprofit group NeighborWorks America.
The study examined a sample of 180,000 borrowers who received counseling in 2008 and 2009. It found that 36% of those homeowners fell back into foreclosure or serious delinquency (defined as missing at least three months of payments) within eight months of getting help.
That may not sound great, but it’s a whole lot better than the 49% of 150,000 borrowers studied who received loan assistance but no counseling.
The key reason: Counselors have typically worked with dozens of foreclosure cases and know the ins and outs of haggling with mortgage companies. So they are able to extract more significant concessions from lenders than most borrowers can on their own.
The report also found that borrowers who worked with housing counselors reduced their payments, on average, by $267 more per month than they would have without counseling.
By Nick Timiraos
Wall Street Journal
December 17, 2010
Bank of America helpfully sent out a letter last week informing a Brooklyn homeowner that the bank didn’t have all the documents needed to finalize a loan modification application.
“Our records indicate that we are still missing some of the required documents, or some of the documents were sent to us with missing or incorrect information,” said the form letter dated Dec. 6.
But there was one problem: the letter was addressed to the couple that sold the Brooklyn apartment in 1998. It arrived in the mailbox of a Wall Street Journal reporter who bought that apartment and has never had a mortgage on it.
It’s no secret that banks’ paperwork problems have plagued the Obama administration’s Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, and the letter offers a glimmer into potential miscues. Borrowers frequently tell of sending and resending paperwork three or four times, while banks often say that modifications aren’t being completed because borrowers aren’t filing all the necessary documentation.
Bank of America says this letter was sent in error after a loan modification negotiator entered in the wrong nine-digit loan number and that the incident appears to have been “very isolated.” “It was simply someone going into a template [who] punched in the wrong number,” said a bank spokeswoman. “Obviously, we’re very sorry for the confusion.”
In this case, no harm, no foul. In light of the recent mortgage-document controversy, perhaps our colleague should feel lucky that it wasn’t a foreclosure notice (or lost pet parrot) instead.
HAMP lowers borrowers’ monthly payments for five years if borrowers successfully complete three months of a so-called trial modification. Bank of America, which is the nation’s largest mortgage servicer, has the largest backlog of trial modifications that are at least six months old and haven’t been made permanent. It had some 32,500 “aged trials” in October, compared to 7,100 for J.P. Morgan Chase, the next largest volume.
By ELIOT BROWN
Wall Street Journal
DECEMBER 15, 2010
Boston-based Beacon Capital Partners has closed on a modification of a troubled $2.7 billion loan, which was one of the largest commercial-real-estate loans to ever be securitized, a company official confirmed Tuesday.
Beacon used the loan, which was carved up into commercial-mortgage-backed securities, to buy a 20-building office portfolio in Seattle and Washington, D.C., in 2007 near the top of the market.
Earlier this year, Beacon reworked debt on Seattle's Columbia Center.
"We believe this is a good outcome for the bondholders and the equity," Beacon's president, Fred Seigel, said of the recent restructuring in a brief interview Tuesday.
The deal marks Beacon's second major debt restructuring this year. It follows Beacon's reworking of a $380 million securitized loan on a separate property in Seattle, the 76-story Columbia Center, for which Beacon received a three-year extension, with options for two more years.
While full details about the modifications weren't available, the restructurings appear to allow Beacon to escape the risk of CMBS investors foreclosing on its giant holdings, which hit trouble when higher rents failed to materialize amid the economic crisis.
The 20-building, 9.9-million-square-foot portfolio was acquired from the Blackstone Group in 2007. It had been owned by Equity Office Properties, a public company that Blackstone acquired that year.
The loan to finance the purchase was so large—second in the CMBS market only to the $3 billion first mortgage for the 2006 purchase of Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village in New York City—that it was spread out over seven batches of securities.
Failing to meet bullish assumptions made in 2007, the income on the properties was barely covering the mortgage payments, with a slim debt service coverage ratio of 1.08 at the end of last year, according to research firm Trepp.
Beacon sought to decrease those payments, stretching out the loan while cutting its interest rate.
An agreement reached on Dec. 3 calls for a five-year extension to 2017 on the interest-only loan, with the interest rate getting cut from 5.797% to 3%, according to ratings agency Standard and Poor's, which was informed about the deal. In addition, Beacon must put in $200 million in new collateral, according to S&P.
Such workouts have become customary in the CMBS market. Special servicers who oversee the multitude of troubled loans are beginning to process and return to normal many of the problematic loans made between 2005 and 2007. But more CMBS loans are running into trouble every week, bringing the delinquency rate to near record highs.
Investors in the $2.7 billion Beacon workout are likely to benefit differently from the modification, based on the risk level of the bonds they hold. Given that the extension chops the loan's overall interest rate, those holding the last-to-be-paid bonds are likely to see revenues dry up, as the newly lowered interest payments typically wouldn't cascade all the way to the lowest bondholders.
By Meena Thiruvengadam
Wall Street Journal
DECEMBER 14, 2010
The Obama administration’s flagship foreclosure prevention effort may ultimately aid just 700,000 borrowers–far short of the up to four million homeowners it had aimed to assist, according to an oversight report released Tuesday.
“It’s not what we were all hoping for, but it is something,” said Ted Kaufman, who chairs the Congressional Oversight Panel, which authored the report. The Obama administration launched its Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) in 2009, committing up to $75 billion to rescuing homeowners struggling under the weight of their mortgages. Now, however, it appears the Obama administration may spend just $4 billion on its flagship effort.
The program offers financial incentives to coax mortgage servicers into modifying loans held by homeowners on the verge of default. It also provides financial incentives to borrowers to urge them to remain current on their mortgage payments.
“Absent a dramatic and unexpected increase in HAMP enrollment, many billions of dollars set aside for foreclosure mitigation may well be left unused. As a result, an untold number of borrowers may go without help,” the report said.
The Treasury has so far made incentive payments of less than $800 million in connection to HAMP. “We always expected the money would not be paid out at that high a rate,” said Tim Massad, Treasury’s acting assistant secretary for financial stability. He noted that payments are only made for successful permanent loan modifications.
In a conference call with reporters, Massad conceded the program will fall short of its goal of aiding three to four million struggling homeowners. The Congressional Oversight Panel cited Treasury’s failure to require servicer participation, failure to hold servicers accountable and decision to outsource critical program functions to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with curbing the program’s potential.
“Treasury has essentially outsourced the responsibility for overseeing servicers to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but both companies have critical business relationships with the very same servicers, calling into question their willingness to conduct stringent oversight,” the panel said.
Also, the panel said modifications often push borrowers further underwater on their mortgages, giving them just “a slim chance of returning to positive equity in the foreseeable future.”
Of the more 483,000 permanent mortgage modifications in progress under HAMP, most have left borrowers with unpaid principal balances that are higher than they were premodification.
The number of modifications in permanent status also is a fraction of the nearly 1.4 million trial modifications initiated under the program. More than half the trial modifications launched under the program have failed.
As a whole, the HAMP has had “a lot less impact on the housing market than we thought it would have,” Kaufman said.
By Dawn Wotapka
Wall Street Journal
DECEMBER 7, 2010
Back in August, we reported that a loan mod saved Jim and Alexis Bellino – cast members on Bravo’s “Real Housewives of Orange County”-from foreclosure. Well, the saga appears to have taken a negative turn: The Bellinos had a “property foreclosure notice” published in their local newspaper, RadarOnline.com reports.
The couple purchased their Newport Beach, Calif., mansion at the height of the real-estate frenzy. They paid $4.56 million in August 2007, a month after the county’s median home price struck an all-time high and then plunged 42%, the Orange County Register has reported. The Bellinos couldn’t be reached for comment.
The loan mod helped the couple with three children narrowly avoid foreclosure earlier this year. They’ve been trying to unload the six-bedroom, six-bath home, but even slashing the price hasn’t helped: The asking price reportedly fell to $3.7 million on Nov. 29, from about $5 million on Nov. 10. With penalties for missed payments added in, the debt on the house is now $4.7 million, RadarOnline reports.
The Real Housewives are no strangers to real-estate drama. We’ve previously written about Orange County Housewife Tamra Barney, who unloaded her 4,300-square-foot Tuscan-style abode in a short sale earlier this year. Earlier this year, another OC housewife, Jeana Keough, used a loan mod to avoid foreclosure on her seven-bedroom, nine-bathroom home.
By Alan Zibel
Wall Street Journal
DECEMBER 1, 2010
Acting Comptroller of the Currency John Walsh said he has directed banks to halt foreclosure proceedings if borrowers are starting loan-assistance programs, if legally possible.
The so-called dual-track system in which banks proceed with foreclosures while evaluating borrowers for loan assistance has gained attention in recent weeks. At a Senate Banking Committee hearing Wednesday, Walsh called the system “unnecessarily confusing for distressed homeowners.”
Sen. Jeff Merkley (D., Ore.) called that process “enormously confusing and enormously stressful” for families facing foreclosure.
Another regulator disagreed. Edward DeMarco, acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, said simultaneous actions are necessary at times. That’s because foreclosures can take an extended period of time and because borrowers don’t always respond to offers for help, he said.
Donald Bisenius, an executive vice president at mortgage titan Freddie Mac (FMCC), also opposed ending the dual-track system. “Unnecessary delays in an already lengthy foreclosure process would be counterproductive,” he said in prepared remarks.
Mortgage companies say they are fixing the problems and will return to a normal foreclosure process quickly. Obama administration officials said they are investigating the issue and haven’t found evidence of a threat to the U.S. financial system.